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Susan Haack
COHERENTISM DISCOMPOSED:
A CRITIQUE OF BONJOUR’S THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL
KNOWLEDGE
Empirical knowledge — if there be any such thing —is
distinguished by having as an essential factor [...]
something disclosed in experience. [...] There undoubtedly is some logical relation of facts [...] to which the
name ‘coherence’ might aptly be given. [...] But no
logical relationship, by itself, can ever be sufficient to
establish the truth, or the credibility even, of any
synthetic judgement. [Lewis]1

I think Lewis is quite right to hold that its inability to allow the relevance of
experience to justification is an insuperable difficulty for coherentism. Coherentists, however, naturally enough, argue that the difficulty is superable. This paper
is a case study of one attempt to overcome it: BonJour’s2.
BonJour attempts to accommodate experiential input within a coherentist
framework by means of the imposition of an additional requirement, the
‘Observation Requirement’, on justification. This, however, turns out to be
ambiguous: on one interpretation it is compatible with coherentism but fails to
guarantee experiential input; on the other, it guarantees observational input all right
but sacrifices the coherentist character of the theory.
To motivate his theory of justification, which he describes as an internalist
coherentism, BonJour relies on an argument by elimination, an argument which
presupposes that two dichotomies — foundationalism versus coherentism and
internalism versus externalism — between them provide an adequate categorisa1
O. I. Lewis, The Given Element in Empirical Knowledge, Philosophical Review, 61, 1952, pp.
168—175, pp. 168—169.
2
L. BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA,
1985; I shall also refer to BonJour’s Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge, Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, 5, 1980, pp. 53—74.
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tion of the alternatives available. I have argued elsewhere that the first of these
dichotomies is not exhaustive1; and the second, in my view, is not robust enough to
carry any serious weight at all2. So naturally I think BonJour’s strategy ill-chosen.
Of course, BonJour might, for all that, have a successful theory to offer. In fact, as
I shall argue, he does not; in the end his theory succumbs to the familiar objection
that coherentism really cannot accommodate experience. But only in the end:
BonJour is aware of the potential objection and develops quite a sophisticated
manoeuvre to avoid it — a manoeuvre which, however, fails, and fails, perhaps, in
ways which reflect the inadequacies of BonJour’s map of the logical space of
possible theories of justification.
BonJour’s is a moderated, degree-of-embedding coherentism, articulated by
means of a distinction between local and global levels of justification. At the local
level, where the concern is the justification of a single belief within the context of
a cognitive system the justification of which is taken for granted, BonJour concedes
that support relations look linear. But at the global level, where the concern extends
to the justification of the overall system, they are seen to be essentially holistic.
Even the justification of a single belief ultimately requires it to be supported by
local, linear connections with other beliefs within an overall system which is
justified holistically, by means of its coherence. Coherence, as BonJour conceives
it, comes in degrees; and depends, not just on the logical consistency of the
cognitive system, but also on its degree of probabilistic consistency, the
pervasiveness and strength of its internal inferential connections, its degree of
freedom from unexplained anomalies, etc.
BonJour’s theory is internalist not only in the sense that it makes justification
exclusively a matter of relations among a subject’s beliefs (in this sense, any
coherence theory is internalist) but also in the sense that it requires that the
justification of a belief rely on premisses, as BonJour puts it, ‘possessed by’ 3 the
subject himself. This requirement leads BonJour to introduce a principle he calls
the ‘Doxastic Presumption’ and describes as a presupposition of a subject’s having
any justified beliefs at all: that a believer ‘must [...] have an adequate grasp of his
total system of beliefs’4. This is all pretty vague, of course, but fortunately this
vagueness will not stand in the way of my critique.
BonJour acknowledges the force of the intuition that an adequate account of
the justification of empirical beliefs must allow some role to experience
1
S. Haack, Theories of Knowledge: An Analytic Framework, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 83, 1982—1983, pp. 143—157.
2
W. P. Alston, Intemalism and Externalism in Epistemology, Philosophical Topics, XVI.1, 1986, pp.
179—-221, and An Internalist Externalism, Synthese, 74,1988, pp. 265—283; though I am not sure that
Alston has quite got to the bottom of the problem, I am convinced that he is right to question whether
there is any simple dichotomy here.
3
See BonJour, Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge, p. 55.
4
BonJour, 77ie Structure of Empirical Knowledge, p. 102.
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(‘observation’ is his word — perhaps not the happiest choice, but it will do no
harm to use his terminology in what follows). BonJour also acknowledges that there
is reason to suspect that a coherence theory, which by definition holds that all
justification is inferential, a matter of relations among beliefs, may be in principle
incapable of satisfying this requirement. But he thinks that the apparent difficulty
can be overcome.
There are two senses, he suggests, in which a belief may be said to be ‘noninferential’: with respect to its origin and with respect to its justification. There are
indeed, BonJour concedes, beliefs which are non-inferential in origin, i.e., beliefs
such that what causes the subject to have them in the first place is not an inference
from other beliefs of his, but something else — observation or introspection. But
there are, he insists, no beliefs which are non-inferential with respect to
justification, i.e., beliefs such that what justifies them is something other that their
inferential relationships to other beliefs of the subject. One might reasonably feel
some unease already: isn’t inference, after all, one way of arriving at a belief?
BonJour is not as clear as one could wish on this point, but his position seems to be
that what matters where justification is concerned is not what prompted the belief
originally but what sustains it at the time in question. He also remarks that it is not
necessary that the subject have gone explicitly through the inferential steps needed
for justification; but it is not enough, he adds, that the inference be ‘available’ — it
must actually be the subject’s reason for continuing to hold the belief. None of this
is very satisfactory, but my strategy will be to work with it for the present. As the
argument develops, it will become clear that BonJour himself cannot consistently
maintain the distinction introduced here; but nothing is to be gained, I think, by
crossing this bridge before we come to it.
Armed with this distinction, BonJour suggests that beliefs which are noninferential in origin may be justified, inferentially, by means of an argument which
appeals to their non-inferential origin; an this, he argues, will make it possible to
allow a role to experience (‘observation’) while remaining faithful to the coherentist
conception of justification as exclusively inferential.
At the local level, the justification of an ‘observational’ belief, say, that there is
a red book on the desk in front of me, might go, according to BonJour, like this:
(1—0) I have cognitively spontaneous belief of kind K that there is a red book
on the desk in front of me;
(2—0) conditions C obtain;
(3—0) cognitively spontaneous beliefs of kind K in conditions C are likely to
be true;
So: (4—0) [probably] there is a red book on the desk in front of me. ‘Cognitively
spontaneous’ means, in effect, ‘non inferential in origin’. ‘Kind K’ in the present
context would be something like ‘putatively visual’, construed as saying
something both about the content of the belief and about its etiology.
‘Conditions C’ might be e.g., to the effect that lighting conditions are normal, that
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I am not under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs, etc.
The adequacy of such a local justification depends in turn on the justifiability
of the premisses. (2—0) and (3—0), BonJour argues, being more or less
straightforward empirical beliefs, will be justified in what according to his theory
is the usual fashion, i.e., by being suitably embedded in a sufficiently coherent
beliefset. (1—0), he suggests, is really a conjunction of there claims: (a) that the
subject has the belief in question; (b) that it is of kind K; (c) that it is cognitively
spontaneous. Subpremiss (a), according to BonJour, is justified by means of the
Doxastic Presumption; subpremiss (b) is justified in part — where the content of
the belief is concerned — again via the Doxastic Presumption, and in part — where
its etiology is concerned — by introspection.
This means that (in strikingly internalist fashion) the justification of
‘observational’ beliefs always depends in part on the justification of introspective
beliefs. At the local level, the justification of an introspective belief, say that I
believe that there is a red book on the desk in front of me, might go, according to
BonJour, like this:
(1—I) I have a cognitively spontaneous belief of kind K’ that I believe that
there is a red book on the desk in front of me;
(3—I) cognitively spontaneous beliefs of kind K’ are usually true;
So:
(4—I) [probably] I believe that there is a red book on the desk
in front of me.
(No analogue of (2—0) is needed, BonJour thinks, because the reliability of
introspection, unlike the reliability of observation, is not normally sensitive to the
conditions obtaining at the time.)
The adequacy of such a local justification is supposed to depend, again, on the
justifiability of the premisses. (3—I), according to BonJour, is a more or less
straightforward empirical claim, and hence justified in the same way as (3—0); and
(1—I), he suggests, may be justified in the same way as (1—0).
BonJour realises that this account of how it is possible for observation to play
a role still doesn’t establish that observational input is necessary for the justification
of empirical beliefs. And it is here that his ‘Observation Requirement’ comes in.
His statement of this requirement, which he describes as a ‘regulative metaprinciple’ and admits is ‘obviously quite vague’, runs as follows:
[I]n order for the beliefs in a cognitive system to be even candidates for empirical justification,
that system must contain laws attributing a high degree of reliability to a reasonable variety of
cognitively spontaneous beliefs (including [...] those kinds of introspective beliefs which are required
for the recognition of other cognitively spontaneous beliefs) 7.

The Observation Requirement is crucial to what BonJour calls the
‘metajustification’ of his theory of justification; his argument, that is, that his
Ibid., p. 141.

20 criteria of justification are truth-indicative. Since BonJour accepts a correspondence theory of truth, the thesis at which his metajustification aims is that:
[A] system of beliefs which (a) remains coherent (and stable) over the long run and (b) continues
to satisfy the Observation Requirement is likely, to a degree which is proportional to this degree of
coherence (and stability) and the longness of the run, to correspond closely to independent reality 8.

The role of the Observation Requirement in this metajustification, according to
BonJour, is that is ‘guarantees that the system of beliefs will receive ongoing
observational input', which ‘provides the basic reason for thinking that a system of
beliefs is likely to be true’9; for the best explanation of the continued coherence and
stability of a system of beliefs in the face of ongoing observational input, he argues,
is that the beliefs concerned correspond, at least approximately, to reality.
My target is not this metajustificatory argument as such (though I have my
doubts about whether it would withstand detailed critical scrutiny), but the claim
that the Observation Requirement guarantees that a system satisfying it receives
ongoing observational input, on which the metajustificatory argument depends.
If one looks again at BonJour’s statement of the Observation Requirement, an
ambiguity reveals itself between what I shall call a doxastic and an experientialist
interpretation. On the doxastic interpretation, the Observation Requirement
requires that the subject believe that he has cognitively spontaneous beliefs, and
that the subject believe that cognitively spontaneous beliefs are generally reliable.
On an experientialist interpretation, it requires that the subject have cognitively
spontaneous beliefs, and that he believe that cognitively spontaneous beliefs are
generally reliable. (In either case, one assumes, since the Observation Requirement
is called ‘the Observation Requirement’, that the ‘cognitively spontaneous beliefs’
spoken of include beliefs prompted by the subject’s sensory experience.) BonJour’s
statement is exactly ambiguous between these two interpretations: in saying that a
system of beliefs ‘must contain laws attributing [...] reliability to [...] cognitively
spontaneous beliefs’ BonJour might or might not be saying that the system must
actually contain cognitively spontaneous beliefs. Which interpretation does
BonJour really intend? I don’t think there is a determinate answer. It is not just that
BonJour has expressed himself a bit ambiguously; the ambiguity, presumably
unconscious, is masking a serious difficulty for his theory.
There is plenty of further textual evidence to support this diagnosis of
equivocation. Introducing his account of the inferential justification of beliefs
which are non-inferential in origin, BonJour writes as if the subject’s beliefs
« Ibid., p. 171. ’
Ibid., p. 170.
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about the origin of his beliefs are true — but then immediately comments, in
parenthesis, that he is doing this only for convenience of exposition:
will be convenient to ignore the case in which the belief in question is not a cognitively
spontaneous belief in the first place. [...] I will also not trouble to distinguish between the actual facts
of each situation and [the subject’s] [...] conception thereof, but will simply assume that the latter is
in accordance with the former. [...] [A]llowing for the opposite possibility would greatly complicate
the discussion, but would not significantly affect the main issue. 10

On the page immediately following the initial statement of the Observation
Requirement, BonJour tells us that the Observation Requirement ‘effectively
guarantees that a cognitive system which satisfies it will receive at least apparent
input from the world’1 2. But by the chapter following the one in which he
introduced the Observation Requirement, where he is deploying it as a vital element
of his metajustification, ‘at least apparent’ has conveniently been dropped, and one
finds BonJour claiming that ‘[t]he Observation Requirement [...] guarantees that
the system of beliefs will receive ongoing observational input’12.
I hope it requires no very elaborate argument to back up my claim that in its
doxastic version the Observation Requirement (so-called: the term now starts to
look tendentious) does not guarantee observational input (either at a time or
‘ongoing’). Perhaps it might be suggested that if the doxastic Observation
Requirement is satisfied and the subject is justified in some beliefs which are
observational in origin, then the subject must not only believe, but believe with
justification, that he has beliefs which are observational in origin. This is true; but
it is still clearly insufficient to guarantee input from the world. Possibly BonJour is
covertly influenced by the apparently reassuring thought that his metajustification
establishes that if the subject believes with justification that he has beliefs which
are observational in origin, then probably he does have beliefs which are
observational in origin. But of course this makes matters no better; for BonJour’s
metajustification itself relies on the assumption that input from the world is
guaranteed if the Observation Requirement is satisfied, so this apparently
reassuring though really gives no reassurance at all.
The trickiest part of the argument is to show how, in its experientialist
interpretation, the Observation Requirement radically alters the character of
BonJour’s theory. It will be useful to begin by offering two thumbnail sketches of
the accounts of justification resulting from the two interpretations:
First (doxastic) interpretation:
S is justified in believing that p if:

10

Ibid., p. 119.
Ibid., p. 142.
12
Ibid., p. 170.
2
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(1) (i) p is suitably embedded in S’s belief-set;
(1) (ii) S’s belief-set is coherent and
(1) (iii) (doxastic OR) includes beliefs to the effect that
certain beliefs in the set are cognitively spontaneous.
Second (experientialist) interpretation:
S is justified in believing that p if:
(local level)
(2) (i) p is suitably embedded in S’s belief-set;
(global level)
(2) (ii) S’s belief-set is coherent and
(2)
(iii) (experientialist OR) includes cognitively spon
taneous beliefs.
The first interpretation yields what BonJour purports to offer: a (strongly)
internalist coherentism — which, however, does not guarantee experiential input.
The second interpretation yields something which does guarantee experiential
input — which, however, is no longer at all the kind of theory BonJour purported
to be offering; no longer, in particular, a coherentist theory.
Clause (1) (iii) is purely doxastic, couched purely in terms of relations among
the subject’s beliefs, and hence entirely consonant with coherentism. Clause (2)
(iii), however, is not purely doxastic, not couched purely in terms of relations
among a person’s beliefs, and hence not compatible with coherentism. For what it
says is that that some beliefs in a system are observational in origin is a necessary
condition for any belief in the system to be justified. (I note, by the by, that this is
of course quite at odds with BonJour’s insistence on the distinctness of questions
of origin and questions of justification.)
However, though on the second interpretation BonJour’s account would not
qualify as coherentist, it would not qualify as foundationalist either. I shall assume
that it is not just required that the system include some cognitively spontaneous
beliefs but in particular that the beliefs the subject believes to be cognitively
spontaneous be cognitively spontaneous. (Unless one assumes this, it is hard to
make any coherent sense of the second account.) Then we would have, in effect,
two classes of belief — those the justification of which depends on their being
observational in origin and those the justification of which does not so depend; but
the distinction would not correspond to the foundationalists’ distinction of basic
and derived beliefs. For basic beliefs must be justified otherwise than by the
support of further beliefs; whereas in this reconstructed version of BonJour’s
theory cognitively spontaneous beliefs would depend for their justification on the
support of other beliefs as well as on their observational origin.
We feel, in short, a pull towards an intermediate style of theory, neither
foundationalist nor coherentist. And this confirms a claim for which I have argued
more directly elsewhere: that the most plausible approach to the theory of empirical
justification would allow the relevance of experience without requiring any
privileged class of beliefs justified by experience alone — would
(local level)
(global level)

be, as I have put it, ‘foundherentist’13. Not that the theory reconstructed on the
experientialist interpretation of BonJour’s ‘Observation Requirement’ is exactly
like the foundherentist theory I have suggested; it is unlike it, in particular, in
requiring a sharp distinction between beliefs which are observational and beliefs
which are inferential in origin. But the reconstructed neither-foundationa- list-norcoherentist version of BonJour’s theory, allowing, as it does, both a role to
experience and pervasive mutual support, is recognisably foundherentist in
tendency.
13

S. Haack, Theories of Knowledge: An Analytic Framework, and Rebuilding the Ship While Sailing
on the Water, [in:] Perspectives on Quine, eds. R. Barret and R. Gibson, Blackwell’s, Oxford 1990, pp.
Ill—127, section 1.

